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Abstract 
In this study we investigate the role played by the state as controlling shareholder in setting CEO 
incentives. Analyzing listed telecommunication companies from 13 European countries during 1999-
2013, we measure the difference between the state and a private dominant shareholder in setting CEO 
compensation packages. We find that state control curbs the level of CEO compensation and this 
effect weakens as the state’s ownership stake increases. When we focus on CEO incentive 
compensation, we report that CEO pay for performance sensitivity is higher for state controlled firms 
than for private firms. However, as the state’s ownership stake increases, differences in sensitivity 
tend to disappear, but the effect of governance variables commonly used to proxy entrenchment 
becomes statistically significant. 
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1. Introduction 
CEO compensation has recently sparked an intense debate around the world. Murphy (1999) 
documents that the number of academic papers focused on executive compensation has risen 
consistently over the last two decades. Excessive pay and corporate scandals have shaking also media 
and public attention, suggesting that the design of the CEO pay structure deserve a closer scrutiny. 
Also in the telecommunication industry, CEO remunerations have attracted a lot of attention by media 
and public opinion in the US and in the EU
1
.  
This study attempts to link CEO pay for performance sensitivity with the controlling shareholders. 
In particular, we examine CEO compensation packages and how controlling state shareholders 
influence the level and the structure of CEO compensation in European telecommunication 
companies. Telecommunication industry offers an interesting setting to explore this relationship. Since 
‘80s, governments have liberalized this sector and most of the companies have been privatized. Today 
the industry appears to be the most competitive and liberalized industry compared to electricity, gas 
and water sectors (Torres and Baciller, 2013; Mediobanca, 2015). Privatization and liberalization lead 
European telecoms to make decisions to increase their efficiency as any other competitive company. 
However, telecoms exhibit an interesting ownership structure. In spite of the privatization wave, it is 
well known that governments are still the controlling shareholders of many telecom companies. Such 
liberalized market and ownership structure allow us to test the effect of private or public owners on 
CEO incentives and it helps to better explain the effects of CEO compensation under the light of the 
incentive theory or the managerial power view. The intra-industry analysis helps to isolate the 
influences of other industry-specific factors that may affect CEO compensation packages. Specifically, 
we focus on European publicly listed fixed telecom operators, i.e. very large companies which 
typically used to be state-owned incumbents before the privatization and the liberalization of the 
industry. This set of firms allows us to study the potential impact of private or state ownership on CEO 
incentives. 
CEO compensation has been considered as a powerful tool to attract, discipline and motivate 
managers. The corporate governance literature explains CEO compensation by referring to two main 
theories: incentive theory, or optimal contracting theory, (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Core and Lacker 
2002) and managerial power theory or entrenchment view (Bebchuck and Fried, 2003; 2006; 
Weisbach 2007). According to the incentive theory, CEO compensation packages, that tie CEO wealth 
to shareholders’ value, can be a powerful incentive for CEOs. Such governance mechanism (called 
pay for performance sensitivity) allows the alignment of CEO’s interests with those of the 
shareholders and aims to reduce the agency problems between managers and shareholders.  
Alternately, the entrenchment view considers CEO compensation as part of the agency problem 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; 2006; Weisbach 2007; Croci et al., 2012). CEO has the power to control 
the board and set his own compensation. Exploiting his influence on the board, CEO can obtain 
compensation packages that increase his salary regardless of firm performance (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
                                                     
1
 “Telecoms operators are cash rich and seem not to worry about the amounts they pay top executives. There are no 
formulas and companies have to ensure they don't annoy their customers” (GTB-Global Telecoms Business, 16 February 
2014). See also: “As the stock prices of European phone companies sink ever lower, chief executives' compensation is 
increasing. That is because troubled telecommunications operators are finding that they need to pay more to attract fresh 
talent willing to parachute into some of the biggest messes in the corporate world. The latest example is France Telecom 
SA. The French operator, with debts […] that are seven times the company's stock-market value, Wednesday named 
Thierry Breton chief executive officer. His pay will be several times that of his predecessor, Michel Bon, ousted last 
month for failing to move aggressively enough to reduce that debt load after a series of acquisitions. The richer pay 
package partly reflects a realization of how hard it will be to turn around the likes of France Telecom and how risky it is 
to jump into such a situation”. Wall Street Journal, 3 October 2002 
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In this context, dominant shareholders have a strong governance role. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
suggest that controlling shareholders can provide an effective monitoring. They have enough voting 
rights to put pressure on the management and, in some cases, exert control over the assets of the firm 
to have their interests respected (p. 755). Wright and Lockett (2003) and Schnatterly et al. (2008) 
show that the largest shareholder has access to preferred information and, thereby it may be 
particularly effective in monitoring, disciplining and influence the management. Increasing their 
monitoring, controlling shareholders may discipline the classical agency problem between managers 
and shareholders.  
However, increased shareholding by controlling owners is not an unequivocally positive force. It 
may provide entrenchment against small investors (Claessens et al., 2002; Ding et al., 2007). 
Dominant owners can use their influence to induce management to make decisions that increase 
controlling shareholders’ benefits. Thus, the ultimate effect of controlling shareholders depends upon 
the trade-off between the benefits of control and any private extraction of firm value (Denis and 
McConell, 2003).  
A growing literature suggests that ownership concentration may no matter as much as the type of 
owners (Lehmann and Weigand, 2000; Aguilera et al., 2006; Muller-Kahle, 2015). Aguilera et al., 
(2006) argue that different types of shareholders have significantly different strategies and offer 
distinct pressure on the firm (p. 150). In the world’s wealthiest economies, most of the largest 
companies are controlled by families or states (LaPorta et al., 1999, 2002; Claessens et al., 2002; Ding 
et al., 2007). Among others, government ownership represents an interesting case to study. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) point out the governance implications of state-owned firms. State-owned firms are 
technically ‘‘controlled by the public,” but they are run by political bureaucrats who can be considered 
as having ‘‘extremely concentrated control rights, but no significant cash flow rights.” Cash flow 
rights are dispersed among the many taxpayers in a particular country (Cornett et al., 2010). This 
means that state-owned firms are hybrid of dispersed and concentrated ownership. If we view the 
government as a single entity, state-owned corporations have concentrated ownership. Since 
government ownership is funded with money of taxpayers, in this regard, the ultimate ownership of 
state-owned companies is quite dispersed (Denis and McConnell, 2003, p. 3). Moreover, political 
bureaucrats have goals that are often dictated by political interests that may be in conflict with social 
welfare improvements and shareholders’ maximization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Cornett et al., 
2010). This suggests that state-owned firms exhibit extra agency relationships compared to private 
firms (Ding et al., 2007; Calabrò et al., 2013). 
Performance-based incentive payment schemes provide a crucial mechanism to alleviate the 
owner–manager conflict. The conventional wisdom is that the presence of a dominant shareholder 
could strengthen the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation, as a large stake in the 
company motivates the controlling shareholders to monitor managers through incentive compensation 
contracts (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). However, the efficiency of such incentive contract remains a 
puzzle when the controlling shareholder is the government (Anchian, 1977; Shleifer, 1998). 
In our paper we aim to answer to the following questions: (1) How sensitive is the CEO 
compensation to firm performance in telecommunication companies? (2) What is the impact of 
dominant state owner on CEO incentive compensation in these companies? 
Our findings provide general support for both the incentive effect and the entrenchment effect of 
the state as controlling shareholder within telecommunication companies. In fact, we find that CEO 
compensation is sensitive to firm performance. Specifically, the results show that an increase of 10% 
in market capitalization leads to an increase of 2.2% in CEO compensation and an increase of one 
point percent in ROA leads to an increase of 3% in CEO compensation. In addition, we document that 
CEO characteristics, such as CEO age, CEO tenure and CEO duality, influence the level of CEO 
compensation. When we consider the type of controlling shareholder, we find that state control 
reduces the level of CEO compensation and this effect is weaker as the state ownership increases. 
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Further, we report that pay for performance sensitivity is higher for state-controlled firms and we 
document that as the state control increases, we do not observe a significant difference on CEO pay for 
performance sensitivity between state-controlled firms and private controlled firms. Interestingly, 
however, as state control increases, the governance variables that measure the entrenchment effect 
become statistically significant. 
These findings have important policy implications. State control, which is one of the common 
features in many telecommunication companies, might limit the high levels of CEO compensation, 
avoiding rent-expropriation from minority shareholders and taxpayers. Our result documents also that 
state-owned telecommunication companies have a higher pay for performance sensitivity than private 
telecommunication companies, but only up to the 25% threshold of state ownership. However, this 
positive effect becomes weaker as the state becomes the 50% majority shareholder. Moreover, as the 
state controlling share increases to 50% or more, governance variables that are proxy of entrenched 
CEO are statistically significant. This suggests that under government’s control, CEOs are 
significantly more likely to become entrenched with the dominant shareholder (the state), i.e. the 
CEOs succeed in exploiting his/her power, setting his/her own level of compensation regardless of 
firm performance. This implies that in state-owned telecommunication companies, compensation is set 
to motivate the CEO (incentive effect). As the state control increases, the entrenchment effect becomes 
dominant.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next session provides a summary view of 
the literature (Section 2). Section 3 describes the potential problems of CEO pay and incentives in 
telecoms companies. Section 4 presents the data and the sample. Session 5 discusses the methodology 
and the econometric model. Session 6 reports the main findings and Session 7 concludes, showing 
study limitations and implications for theory and practice. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
This study is underpinned by two main theories: incentive theory and entrenchment view. We start 
with a brief overview of the literature and then we review the effects of state as dominant 
shareholders. 
2.1 Incentive theory  
Agency theory was developed by the seminal works of Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983). They point out that when ownership and control are separated, 
the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers arise. Managers can make decisions aimed 
at the maximization of their own utility instead of shareholders’ wealth. Specifically, managers may 
misuse corporate assets for their own personal benefits at the expense of shareholders. 
One of the governance mechanisms that may decrease the agency costs is CEO pay for 
performance. Compensation policies, that tie CEO welfare to shareholder wealth, can be a powerful 
tool to discourage managerial opportunistic behaviors and decrease conflicts between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). There is a vast literature that 
documents the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance around the world and 
they highlight the relevance of the compensation in providing incentives for CEOs. Among others, 
Hall and Liebman (1998), Guay (1999); Frydman and Saks (2010) document that this relationship in 
US companies. Other studies show the differences in CEO compensation packages among different 
countries (Abowd and Bognanno 1995; Muslu, 2010; Conyon et al. 2011; Fernandez, et. al, 2013). An 
interesting study is provided by Croci et al., (2012): looking at only Continental European companies, 
they show that in continental Europe, the differences in the level of CEO compensation depend on the 
ownership structure. They report differences between family controlled firms and institutional 
ownership. This result suggests that the type of controlling shareholder influence CEO incentives. 
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2.2 Entrenchment view 
An alternatively view is the entrenchment theory. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that executive pay 
practices cannot be explained by a model in which shareholders contract optimally with shareholders. 
Rather, they point out that CEO effectively sets his own pay. The idea is that the CEO has a good deal 
of control over the board, and this control includes the power to set a large part of his own 
compensation (Weisbach, 2007). There are a number of reasons why the board is likely to consider the 
CEO’s interests rather than the interests of the shareholders. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) document 
cases in which the board of directors is influenced by its CEO. In the existing literature, a number of 
different explanations has been given for CEO entrenchment. CEO duality and CEO tenure are usually 
considered relevant for CEO entrenchment. CEOs, who also retain the position of chairman, will tend 
to have a greater influence over the selection of board members. For example, a powerful CEO may 
try to appoint non-executive directors who are unlikely to question proposals and business decisions, 
or he/she could reduce the disclosure of information to other board members (Hardwick et al., 2011). 
Stulz (1988) proposed a theoretical model of the entrenchment, which predicts a relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm value. Specifically, he shows that an entrenched manager 
pursues his/her private interests at the expense of outside investors. Morck et al., (1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) empirically prove such relationship.  
Similar results are in the case of firms with a controlling shareholder. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
point out that controlling shareholder may increase the entrenchment effect. They argue “large 
investors may represent their own interests, which need not coincide with the interest of other 
investors in the firm” (p. 758). Controlling shareholders can expropriate wealth from minority 
shareholders in several ways (Morck and Yeung, 2003; Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Croci et al., 2012) 
including executive compensation. 
2.3 Combining incentive theory and entrenchment view: State as controlling shareholder 
When ownership is concentrated in the hand of one owner that has the effective control of the firm, as 
in the case of most countries in the world (La Porta, 1999; Claessens et al, 2002; Faccio and Lang, 
2002), the incentive effect or the entrenchment effect of controlling shareholder becomes an issue. The 
incentive effect of controlling shareholders refers to the argument that controlling shareholders exert 
greater monitoring on management, reduce agency conflicts, and maximize firms’ value (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Chen et al., 2010). In contrast, the entrenchment effect of controlling shareholders 
refers to the argument that controlling shareholders have incentives to maximize their own benefits at 
the cost of minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Several studies identify large 
shareholders as a key mechanism to curb agency costs and increase monitoring on management 
(Muller-Kahle, 2015). Other research shows the entrenchment effect of large shareholders, for 
example, using pyramidal groups and crossholdings makes difficult for minority shareholders to detect 
actions that benefit the controlling shareholders or select board members that are more likely to 
monitor and are less likely to support the dominant owner (Chen et al., 2010). Overall the empirical 
findings examining the impact of dominant owners is mixed (Glassman and Rhoades, 1980; Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1995; Claessen et al, 2002; Dalton et. al, 2003). 
The agency theory and the entrenchment view may be exacerbated by the type of dominant 
shareholders. In state-owned firms there is an extra agency relationship as the controlling owners are 
themselves agents of the true owners: the state (Ding et al., 2007, p. 228). Most studies have found 
that state-owned firms do not better serve the public interest (i.e., Grossman and Krueger, 1993) and, 
in fact, that state-owned firms are typically extremely inefficient (Boycko et al., 1995; Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 2001). Additionally, political bureaucrats often have goals that are in conflict with social 
welfare improvements but are dictated by political interests. This suggests that, in state-owned firms, 
agency costs are relevant because of the perverse incentives of managers/bureaucrats of state-owned 
firms. 
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In the recent years there has been a growing pressure on politicians to limit the excess in the 
management pay. State-owned firms can be easily forced to restrict the CEO compensation especially 
in companies considered as “strategic” for national interests, where a more efficient scrutiny of 
managerial decisions is expected (Barontini and Bozzi, 2011). As suggested by Joskow, Rose and 
Wolfram (1996), and Cambini, Rondi and De Masi (2015), in many utilities, particularly if they are 
controlled by a national or local government, political constraints may impose a cap on the level of 
CEO compensation. Since directors are politicians, or they are appointed by politicians, they are under 
public opinion pressure, and they may be reluctant to allow high level of compensation. Consistently 
with this view, we expect that CEO compensation is lower in companies with state controlling owner. 
Controlling shareholders influence both the level of CEO compensation and the pay-for-
performance link. In Europe, several countries have introduced shareholders’ vote on executive 
compensation packages (Barontini et. al., 2013; Ferri and Maber, forthcoming). State, as controlling 
shareholder, might reduce its monitoring if the entrenchment view prevails. If the state effectively 
controls the decisions of firms, the optimal contracting induces to set a higher pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. The net effect remains a puzzle.  
3. Telecommunication companies and the problem of setting the right incentive 
The issue of setting the right incentive for the CEO is a common problem in every company. Because 
of the peculiarities of telecommunication industry, in the telecoms this issue becomes more relevant 
than in other companies. First, telecommunication companies typically (have to) invest in innovative 
projects to stay competitive. A number of recent innovations have been characterized this industry 
after the liberalization. However, by definition innovations are risky, unpredictable, long-term and 
multistage, labor intensive and idiosyncratic (Holmstrom, 1979). They are risky because the 
probability of failure is high. They are unpredictable because the future contingencies are impossible 
to predict. They are long-term and multi-stage, because a project takes time to be developed and it 
needs multiple stages. They are labor intensive because all stages require substantial human effort, and 
lastly, they are idiosyncratic because it is difficult to compare an innovative project with others. All 
these features raise the problem to give the right incentives to the CEO to push him to undertake 
projects which are innovative and profitable for the firm. As consequence, CEO pay for performance 
sensitivity might be higher in telecommunication companies than in other companies to meet the 
higher risks and the higher volatility as well as technological challenges of the industry (see footnote 1 
for an example from France Telecom).  
Second, CEOs of the telecoms are usually younger than CEOs of other companies (Anderson, 
Banker and Ravindran, 2000). In corporate governance literature, CEO age is typically a proxy of 
experience: the older is the CEO the more experienced he/she is supposed to be. The experience 
reveals also CEO competences. Since a young CEO can be less competent than an old CEO, firms 
might prefer to pay their young and less experienced CEOs with a higher pay for performance 
sensitivity. However, in the telecoms industry a younger CEO may be viewed as more open to 
technological innovation and more flexible to change. In contrast, as also suggested by the literature, 
old CEOs may be less concerned about the long-term consequences of their decisions. All in all, for 
these reasons, CEO pay should be negatively related to his/her age. Third, in the telecommunication 
industry the managerial labor market is very dynamic. This should make change as well as CEO 
turnover more likely. CEO turnover should be controlled for, since in the year of dismissal or quit, the 
exiting CEO’s pay increases.  
Fourth, most of the fixed telecommunication operators are large-sized. They are ex-incumbents or 
they have expanded recently thanks to merger and acquisition with other firms. Rosen (1982), Murphy 
(1999), Gabaix and Landier (2008), and Barontini and Bozzi (2011) show that talented managers 
prefer large firms. This suggests that the level of CEO compensation in telecoms should be high. 
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Fifth, in telecommunication companies the agency costs due to the separation between ownership 
and control may be very relevant. Specifically, in firms with dispersed ownership and high growth 
opportunities as telecom companies, managers are more likely to behave opportunistically than in 
other firms. In this setting, CEO incentive compensation is a powerful mechanism to reduce the 
agency problem and induce CEO to take profitable decisions (even though the literature and the 
anecdotal evidence has shown that this instrument may also reveal undesirable effects, see Bebchuck 
and Fried, 2003 and 2006).  
Sixth, European telecommunication companies have an interesting ownership structure. After the 
liberalization and the privatization some of these firms many went public, opening their capital both to 
new investors and to various categories of shareholders that naturally aim to maximize firm value. 
However, although these firms have been privatized, the state-ownership remains a common feature 
among many telecoms. A private or a state owner may have different objectives and may set different 
incentives for the CEOs. For example, Shleifer (1998) argues that public firms are characterized by 
lower incentive to reduce costs and they have a stronger tendency to transfer resources from the state-
owned firm to political supporters. On the other hand, some contributions support an opposite thesis. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1991) document that the agency problem, that generates divergence between 
principals' and managers' objectives, applies whatever the nature (private or public) of the principals 
themselves.  
Because of all the peculiarities of telecommunication companies and the unclear effect on CEO 
incentives is worth analyzing the context of European telecommunication companies. 
4. Sample and Data 
Empirical studies on CEO compensation in Europe suffer from availability of data on management 
pay. For a long time, such information has been not subject to mandatory disclosure (Barontini et. al., 
2013; Ferarrini 2015). Only recently, many European countries introduced regulations on transparency 
and disclosure. Our study benefits from a unique database on CEO compensation for an unbalanced 
panel of over the period 1999-2013, jointly with detailed data about performance, corporate 
governance and ownership structure of the telecommunication companies. 
Data on compensation and other governance variables have been hand-collected from annual 
reports published by the companies. Financial and accounting data are drawn from Worldscope 
Database. We require companies with compensation data from annual report to have available 
financial data from Worldscope. To control for country-economic differences, we include data on 
GDP which has been downloaded from OECD database. Our final sample accounts for 15 publicly 
traded companies in the telecommunication industry from 13 European countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and The United 
Kingdom). 
CEO compensation is a key variable for this study. Following Jensen and Murphy (1990), we 
calculate CEO compensation as the sum of salary and bonus awarded by the CEO at the end of the 
year. This data are adjusted by inflation. A comprehensive measure of CEO pay should consider the 
values of the CEO’s stock option. Unfortunately, this data was not available for all firms on a 
consistent basis. Specifically, when we tried to collect the data and we found that for most of the 
telecommunication companies in our sample, information about stock options (i.e., the number of 
options, the exercise price, the exercise date etc.) are not fully disclosed. Because we could only rely 
on a partial, approximate picture of the real effect of stock options, we decided to exclude them (this 
partial information would only lead to misleading results). Data on “other compensation” includes data 
of a very different nature such as indemnity paid when the CEO leaves the firm, compensation 
received from consulting services, executive committee participation fee etc. This data was not 
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uniformly reported by each company and, because of this lack of uniformity, this data are not included 
in the CEO compensation variable.  
As measures of firm performance, we use two indicators: a market-based and an accounting-based 
performance measure. The market-based measure is market capitalization, which is the product 
between the share price at the end of the year and the number of outstanding shares in the market. The 
accounting-based measure is Return on Assets (ROA), calculated as the ratio of EBIT to total assets. 
In order to detect the identity of the ultimate shareholder, we follow Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) 
and Croci et al., (2012). We collect data about firm ownership. We use two thresholds as a cut off 
point to identify the dominant owner. The first definition of the state as dominant shareholder is the 
following: if the state holds, directly or indirectly, 25% of the ownership rights, the firm has the state 
as controlling shareholder. The second definition of the state as dominant shareholder considers a 
threshold of 50%. Specifically, if the state holds, directly or indirectly, 50% of the ownership rights, 
the firm has the state as controlling shareholder. 
Since the purpose of the study is to explore the difference between state and private controlling 
shareholders, we create a dummy variable (1 if the controlling shareholder is the state, 0 otherwise) to 
capture the type of the ownership. Consistent with Ding et al., (2007), it is important to note that the 
distinction between controlling right and cash flow right is not an issue in this study. We are interested 
in the controlling owners of the telecoms and the pyramid structure of ownership is outside of our aim. 
In creating this dummy we took the following procedure: if the state (government at federal, state or 
local level) holds 25% or more of the shares of a company, the dummy is equal to 1. Ownership data 
was hand-collected, downloading the annual reports of each firm. 
In testing our hypothesis, we include control variables related to firm characteristics and a set of 
governance variables that previous studies found to have a significant impact on CEO compensation. 
Firm size has been considered as one of the most important variables in explaining the level of CEO 
compensation (Murphy 1999; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Barontini and Bozzi, 2011). As proxy of 
firm size, we use Total Revenues. 
Concerning the CEO characteristics, we control for variables that are proxies for managerial 
entrenchment: CEO tenure, CEO duality, and CEO age. CEO tenure is the number of years served as 
CEO in the company. According to the managerial power theory, with a high tenure, CEO is more 
likely to influence the board and set his own compensation. CEO duality is another proxy of the 
managerial entrenchment. CEO duality is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO is also Chairman. If 
CEO is also Chairman, he/she may use the authority of the board chair role to entrench themselves 
against accountability (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). CEO age indicates CEO experience that it may 
influence the level of compensation. 
Table 1 provides the variable definitions. In table 2 we report the descriptive statistics for the full 
sample and table 3 the telecommunication companies by state-control. The descriptive statistics by 
country are reported in Appendix A. 
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Table 1 - Variables description  
Variable name Label Description Source 
CEO comp CEO compensation It is computed as the sum between 
salary and bonus awarded by CEOs at 
the end of the year. (Thousands of 
Euros) 
Hand collected 
Market Cap Market capitalization It is Market Price-Fiscal Period End * 
Common Shares Outstanding 
Worldscope 
ROA Return on Assets It is calculated as: (Net Income before 
Preferred Dividends + ((Interest 
Expense on Debt-Interest Capitalized) 
* (1-Tax Rate))) / Average of Last 
Year's and Current Year’s Total Assets 
* 100 
Worldscope 
Revenue Total Revenue It represents gross sales and other 
operating revenue less discounts, 
returns 
and allowances. 
Worldscope 
Log (Total Asset) Logarithm of Total Assets  It is the logarithmic transformation 
(base 10) of Total Assets  
Worldscope 
State State as controlling 
shareholder 
It is a dummy that assumes 1 if the 
state (government at federal, state or 
local level) holds 25% or more of the 
shares of a company. 
Company websites 
State 25% Government control rights It is a dummy that assumes 1 if the 
government holds at least 25% of the 
ultimate control rights  
Company websites 
State 50% Government control rights It is a dummy that assumes 1 if the 
government holds 50% of the ultimate 
control rights  
Company websites 
CEO duality CEO duality CEO duality is a dummy that is equal 
to 1 if the CEO is also Chairman 
Company websites 
CEO tenure CEO tenure It indicates the number of years served 
as CEO. 
Company websites 
CEO age CEO age It is the age of the CEO Company websites 
CEO turnover CEO turnover It is a dummy equal to 1 if the CEO 
changes 
Company websites 
GDP GDP GDP of a country in a given year OECD 
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Table 2 - Descriptive statistics (Full Sample) 
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
CEO compensation 128 3445.98 2452.27 508.59 13871.01 
      
Market Cap 128 2.75*10
7
 2.54*10
7
 135308.3 1.05*10
8
 
 
     
Revenue 128 2.55*10
7
 2.60*10
7
 526638.2 9.19*10
7
 
      
ROA 128 7.75 5.60 -14.85 27.04 
 
     
CEO Tenure 128 3.81 2.59 1 14 
 
     
CEO Age 128 53.54 7.85 38 68 
 
     
CEO Duality 128 0.38 0.48 0 1 
 
     
CEO Turnover 128 0.19 0.40 0 1 
 
     
GDP 128 1.18 2.38 -5.6 7.2 
CEO compensation, market cap and revenue are in thousands of 2010 constant dollars. They are adjusted by inflation. CEO 
tenure is the number of years served as CEO. CEO age is the age of the CEO. CEO turnover is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
CEO changes. GDP is the GDP growth rate. 
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Table 3 - Firms by state-control 
 Variable 
Obs 
State-controlled  
(first year) 
State-controlled  
(last year) 
 
   
Telekom Austria AG 128 1 1 
Belgacom SA 128 1 1 
TDC AS 128 0 0 
Sonera OYJ 128 1 1 
Orange SA 128 1 1 
Deutsche Telekom AG 128 1 1 
Telecom Italia SpA 128 0 0 
Koninklijke KPN NV 128 1 0 
Orange Polska SA 128 1 0 
Portugal Telecom SGPS SA 128 0 0 
Telefonica SA 128 0 0 
TeliaSonera AB 128 1 1 
BT Group 128 0 0 
Cable and Wireless 128 0 0 
Kcom Group 128 1 0 
State control is 1 if the state holds, directly or indirectly, 25% (or more) of the shares. 
At the country level, CEO compensation appears to be highest in Spain where firms are very large and 
CEO tenure is very high. This confirms the typically positive correlation between pay and firm size 
and between compensation and the years served as CEO. Managers seem to be well paid in Germany, 
Belgium and (to a lesser extent) Italy, where firms are profitable in terms of ROA and market 
capitalization.  
5. Empirical Models 
Pay for performance sensitivity is the relationship that measures the incentive effects of CEO 
compensation. It is usually defined as a change in CEO pay associated with a change in firm 
performance (Frydman and Saks, 2010; Goergen and Renneboog, 2011). Empirical studies of pay-to-
performance have used a wide range of specifications to measure this relationship. Two common 
alternatives are the euro change in executive wealth per euro change in firm value (the Jensen-Murphy 
statistic), and the percentage change in CEO compensation for 1% change in the firm value (the 
elasticity). The Jensen-Murphy statistic is considered the correct measure of incentives specifically for 
activities whose euro impact is the same regardless of the size of the firm. Elasticity is widely used 
because is not highly sensitive to firm size. In addition, it is particularly effective in studies that do not 
consider revaluation of equity and option holdings (Frydman and Saks, 2010). For all these reasons, 
we report the logarithmic transformation of CEO compensation in order to estimate the elasticity of 
the sensitivity. 
To investigate the CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity in telecommunication companies and the 
relationship between CEO compensation policies and the type of controlling shareholders, we use the 
following model: 
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(1) 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝)𝑖𝑡 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖+𝜖𝑖𝑡  
We rely on two measures of firm performance. The first measure is that of the market capitalization, 
which is measured as the product between the number of outstanding shares and the value of the share 
at the end of the year. Since this measure might be influenced by many factors beyond managers’ 
control, we use an accounting-based measure of performance, that is return on assets, or ROA (EBIT 
to total assets). The coefficient 𝛽1 indicates the incentive effect of CEO compensation. Specifically, 
higher is the coefficient closer is the alignment of interests between the CEO and his shareholders, and 
as consequence, stronger is the incentive for the CEO.  
To control for firm ownership, we include in the model the variable State that is equal to 1 when 
the government has, directly or indirectly, the ultimate control. We control also for a set of governance 
variables that are usually used in the literature to measure the power of the CEO (so called 
“entrenchment effect”). These variables are CEO duality, a dummy equal to 1 if CEO is also 
Chairman, and CEO tenure, the number of years served as CEO in the company. We control also for 
CEO characteristics (CEO age) and CEO turnover that accounts for breaks in the estimation of pay-
for-performance. 
As mentioned above, CEO compensation may be influenced by firm size (Murphy 1999; Gabaix 
and Landier, 2008; Barontini and Bozzi, 2011). We include in the model a proxy of firm size (the 
logarithmic transformation of total revenues). In addition, to control for cross-country heterogeneity in 
the size and growth of country-economies we include GDP (Gross Domestic Product of the country). 
In our second model, we focus on the differences in CEO incentives between state-controlled and 
private-controlled firms. We interact firm performance with the dummy State that indicates whether 
the government is the controlling shareholder. We chose two different thresholds to identify the 
ultimate controlling shareholder. The first threshold is 25%: it allows to establish a blockhoder that 
may control important decisions. The second threshold is 50%: such majority of the shares helps to 
identify the effect of controlling shareholder as the ownership increases.  
In order to control for the entrenchment effect of controlling shareholder, we interact the 
governance variables considered proxies of the entrenchment (Croci et al., 2012) and the dummy State 
both at 25% and at 50%. The model is the following: 
 
(2) 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝)𝑖𝑡 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖+𝜖𝑖𝑡  
As estimation method, we use fixed effects. This method allows to calculate the effect of the change in 
the compensation level within a firm and to control for omitted variables and unobservable firm 
characteristics that are not included in the usual cross-sectional regressions but that can be controlled 
by panel data. The results of the regressions are presented in the next session. 
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6. Results 
In this section we present the results of CEO pay for performance sensitivity in the telecommunication 
companies and the effect of the state as controlling shareholder. Table 4 reports the estimated results 
for Equation (1).  
Table 4 - CEO pay for performance sensitivity and controlling shareholder 
  Log(CEO compensation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       L(Market Cap) 0.22*** 0.21** 0.21*** 
   
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
   ROA 
   
0.03** 0.03* 0.03** 
    
(0.02) (0.09) (0.02) 
L(Revenue) 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.46* 0.52* 0.43* 
 
(0.16) (0.12) (0.17) (0.08) (0.08) (0.8) 
CEO Tenure 0.075*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO Age -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO Duality 0.43*** 0.38*** 0.43*** 0.28** 0.27* 0.29** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02) 
CEO Turnover 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.29) (0.31) (0.40) 
State 25% 
 
-0.57** 
  
-0.33 
 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.40) 
 State 50% 
  
-0.30** 
  
-0.28*** 
    
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.00) 
R-squared 0.42 0.54 0.46 0.47 0.57 0.52 
N. Obs 128 128 128 128 128 128 
N. Firms 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Panel regression with firm-specific fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are 
reported in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Variables are adjusted by 
inflation. L(CEO compensation) is the logarithmic transformation of the sum of salary and bonus awarded at the 
end of the year. L(market cap) is the logarithmic transformation of (number of outstanding shares*share price at 
the end of the fiscal year). ROA is Return on Asset (percentage). L(Revenue) is the logarithmic transformation of 
revenue. CEO tenure is the number of years served as CEO. CEO age is the age of the CEO. CEO duality is a 
dummy equal to 1 if CEO is also Chairman. CEO turnover is a dummy equal to 1 if the CEO changes. GDP is 
the GDP growth rate. State 25% is a dummy equal to 1 if the state holds, directly or indirectly, 25% of the 
shares. State 50% is a dummy equal to 1 if the state holds, directly or indirectly, 50% of the shares. 
In column (1) and (4) of table 4 we estimate the CEO pay for performance sensitivity in listed 
telecoms in Europe using market capitalization and ROA as measures of firm performance. The results 
show that an increase of 10% in market capitalization leads to an increase of 2.2% in CEO 
compensation. Similarly, considering ROA as measure of firm performance, we find that an increase 
of one point percent in ROA leads to an increase of 3% in CEO compensation. Governance variables 
are all statistically significant, showing that CEO characteristics influence CEO compensation. 
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Specifically, CEO tenure controls for changes in compensation due to years served as CEO. The 
coefficient shows that an increase in one year in the CEO tenure leads to an increase of 7.5% in CEO 
compensation. The variable CEO age has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. Since 
CEO age can be considered a proxy of CEO experience, our result suggests that, once we control for 
tenure, the dynamic and technologically-intensive environment in telecom companies tend to reward 
younger CEOs. CEO duality is, instead, a positive and statistically significant. The coefficient shows 
that when CEO is also Chairman his compensation increases consistently. As discussed above, this 
variable captures the extent of CEO power and it is a proxy of the entrenchment effect.  
These results leads to investigate further the role of controlling shareholder on CEO incentive 
compensation. In column (2) and (5) we report the effects of the state as dominant shareholder, when 
its control is 25% of the shares. Specifically, we show that in companies where the state is the 
controlling shareholder, CEO compensation is lower. This result is in line with the previous studies of 
Joskow et al., (1996) and Cambini, Rondi and De Masi (2015) who point out that in state-owned 
companies CEO compensation is lower because of the political constraints on CEO compensation 
imposed, directly or indirectly, by the state. This result may also be a consequence of political 
motivated “moral suasion” to prevent public criticism, as discussed by Hart et al., (1997). 
Column (3) and (6) reports the estimated results when the state has the control, directly or 
indirectly, at 50% of the shares. Consistently with the column (3) and (4), the negative coefficients 
states that CEO compensation is lower in state-controlled companies than in private-controlled 
companies. However, the magnitude of the variable State 50% is higher than the magnitude of the 
variable State 25%. This shows that in companies where the state controls 50% of the shares (or 
more), CEO compensation is higher than in companies where the state controls 25% of the shares. 
This result suggests a possible entrenchment effect that deserves to be investigated more deeply. 
To test the incentive and the entrenchment effects, we estimate Equation (2). Specifically, we 
include variables that interact with the dummy State. Table 5 reports the main results.  
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Table 5 - Incentive versus Entrechment 
  Log(CEO compensation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
       L(Market Cap) 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.16**  
 
(0.19) (0.53) (0.29) (0.29) (0.02)  
L(Revenue) 0.43 0.13 0.46 0.45 0.32  
 
(0.13) (0.44) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16)  
CEO Tenure 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06 0.06 0.74***  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.13) (0.00)  
CEO Age -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03***  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  
CEO Duality 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.42*** 0.43***  
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
CEO Turnover 0.21*** 0.19** 0.20** 0.19** 0.15***  
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)  
GDP -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  
 
(0.14) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)  
State 25% -4.07** -5.88* -5.13* -4.66   
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12)   
L(Market Cap)*State25 0.24** 0.30** 0.27* 0.22   
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.17)   
Age_State25  0.02 0.01 0.01   
 
 (0.29) (0.49) (0.29)   
Tenure_State25   0.05 0.04   
   (0.38) (0.47)   
CEOduality_State25    -0.29   
    (0.19)   
State 50%     -0.43*  
     (0.09)  
L(Market Cap)*State50     0.13  
     (0.24)  
Age_State50     0.02  
     (0.26)  
Tenure_State50     0.08**  
     (0.04)  
CEOduality_State50     0.08***  
      (0.00)  
R-squared 0.40 0.35 0.38 0.43 0.53  
N. Obs 128 128 128 128 128  
N. Firms 15 15 15 15 15  
Panel regression with firm-specific fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported in brackets. *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Variables are adjusted by inflation. L(CEO compensation) is the logarithmic transformation of the 
sum of salary and bonus awarded at the end of the year. L(market cap) is the logarithmic transformation of (number of outstanding shares*share 
price at the end of the fiscal year). ROA is Return on Asset (percentage). L(Revenue) is the logarithmic transformation of revenue. CEO tenure is 
the number of years served as CEO. CEO age is the age of the CEO. CEO duality is a dummy equal to 1 if CEO is also Chairman. CEO turnover is 
a dummy equal to 1 if the CEO changes. GDP is the GDP growth rate. State 25% is a dummy equal to 1 if the state holds, directly or indirectly, 
25% of the shares. State 50% is a dummy equal to 1 if the state holds, directly or indirectly, 50% of the shares. 
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In the column (1) we start interacting the logarithmic transformation of market capitalization with the 
dummy State 25%. This variable helps to identify CEO pay for performance sensitivity in companies 
where the state is the controlling shareholder (threshold is 25% of the shares). The results are 
consistent with our findings above: CEO compensation is lower in state controlled-firms than in 
private controlled firms. In state controlled-firms, CEO compensation is more sensible to firm 
performance variations (the coefficient is positive and statistically significant). This result may suggest 
different explanations. Since the level of CEO compensation is lower in state-controlled companies, 
such firms attract talented managers using a higher CEO pay sensitivity. Starting from Fama (1980), 
many studies suggest that talented managers are attracted by a higher CEO sensitivity. This result 
suggests an incentive effect in setting CEO compensation packages in state-controlled firm. A second 
explanation may be related to the size ad international activities of state-controlled firms. Specifically, 
these firms, which are ex-incumbents, are bigger and more international. As suggested by Yermack 
(1996), CEO pay sensitivity is positively associated to size and complex activities. This may explain 
the higher CEO pay for performance in state-controlled firms. 
Regressions in columns (2)-(3)-(4) include the proxies of CEO entrenchment in state-controlled 
firms. These variables are not statistically significant. We can conclude that there are no differences 
between state-controls firms and private firms.  
In column (5) we report the results when the threshold of state as controlling shareholder is 50%. 
Also in this case, CEO compensation is lower in state controlled firms than in private controlled firms. 
However, the variable L(Market Cap)*State 50, that indicates the CEO pay for performance sensitivity 
in state controlled firms, is not statistically significant. The variables Tenure_State 50 and CEO 
duality_State 50, that are commonly used as proxy of the entrenchment effect, are positive and 
statistically significant. Specifically, the coefficient suggests that there is difference in the effect of an 
additional year served as CEO between state-controlled firms and no-state controlled firms. Similar 
results for CEO duality. These differences are higher for firms controlled by the state. These findings 
may suggest that as the state control increases, the entrenchment effect is stronger. 
7. Conclusions 
A large number of studies have focused on firm-specific determinants of CEO compensation and CEO 
pay for performance sensitivity. In this paper we study the effect of the state as controlling shareholder 
on the level of CEO compensation and on CEO pay for performance sensitivity in telecommunication 
companies. This paper is aimed at studying the incentive and entrenchment effect when the state is the 
dominant owner. Given the privatization processes and the relevance of the state ownership in the 
telecommunication industry, we focus on European listed telecommunication companies.  
We perform a cross-country analysis of CEO compensation in order to examine how state control 
can influence the CEO compensation level and the pay for performance sensitivity link. We show shat 
in telecommunication companies, CEO compensation is sensitive to a variation of firm performance 
which is measured by a stock-market based measure and by an accounting-based measure. 
Specifically, an increase of 10% in market capitalization leads to an increase of 2.2% in CEO 
compensation. An increase of one point percent in ROA leads to an increase of 3% in CEO 
compensation. Our findings document that CEO characteristics influence CEO compensation. 
Specifically, the variable CEO tenure is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient shows 
that an increase in one year in the CEO tenure leads to an increase of 7.5% in CEO compensation. 
CEO age is negative and statistically significant coefficient. It suggests that CEO experience does not 
positively influence CEO compensation. CEO duality, a measure of CEO power and it entrenchment 
effect, is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient shows that when CEO is also Chairman 
his compensation increases consistently. 
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We discuss the influence of state on CEO incentives. We report evidence that state control 
decreases the level of CEO compensation. We document that this effect is higher when the state-
control is measured with a threshold of 25% of the shares. This effect becomes weaker as the threshold 
of the state control is 50%.  
Looking at CEO pay for performance sensitivity we find that in state-controlled firms, CEO 
compensation is more sensitive to change in firm performance than in private controlled firms. This 
result supports the optimal contracting hypothesis between manager and shareholder (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). However, when state ownership concentration reaches a high level (50% and more), 
the controlling shareholder tends to relax the incentive hypothesis. The differences in governance 
variables, which are proxy of entrenchment, are positively and statistically significant when the state 
control threshold is 50%. 
This study has important implications. First, this research finds support for incentive theory of 
controlling shareholder. In telecommunication companies, CEO compensation is linked to firm 
performance. As when firms are subjected to increased monitoring by the state, the level of CEO 
compensation decreases whereas CEO pay for performance sensitivity increases. As pointed out by 
Joskow et al. (1996) and Cambini et al. (2015), in many firms, which are controlled by a national or 
local government, CEO remuneration is lower. This is because directors are politicians or they are 
appointed by politicians who are pressured by public opinion. In order to avoid that the public opinion 
may judge executive compensation excessive, such boards set a lower CEO compensation. Second, 
this study suggests that as state control increases, bureaucrats-shareholder may entrench with CEO. 
Our results have implications also for policy-makers, who may rethink about the role of state 
controlling shareholders. In conclusion, this study makes a contribution to the literature and practice 
with regards to international comparative corporate governance. It is hoped that these findings will 
generate additional research on these important issues. 
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Appendix A – Descriptive statistics by country 
 
 
CEO compensation Market Capitalization Revenue ROA 
Country Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
 
       
 
Austria 1377.43 340.41 6235305 3327863 6312958 1017733 4.37 2.84 
 
        
Belgium 4142.64 2104.30 1.20*10
7
 3056989 8283571 687915.70 17.45  4.97 
 
        
Denmark 1940.15 495.57 8330587 2663953 6630903 2608382 8.63 2.42 
 
        
Finland 551.26 38.42 2.71*10
7
 2.82*10
7
 2229733 22126.80 14.68 6.01 
 
        
France 2211.39 621.70 5.88*10
7
 2.44*10
7
 6.20*10
7
 1.51*10
7
 7.86 2.51 
         
Germany 4247.61 633.40 7.37*10
7
 1.84*10
7
 8.10*10
7
 7504741 4.48 3.11 
 
        
Italy 4572.53 1608.60 3.52*10
7
 2.27*10
7
 3.95*10
7
 5808486 6.36 2.83 
 
        
Holland 3951.43 2133.20 2.23*10
7
 7801711 1.66*10
7
 3176499 10.47 2.87 
 
        
Poland 1148.91 389.84 7547657 3630182 5502424 1539247 3.01 3.23 
         
Portugal 1567.58 273.23 6729224 3394917 4115316 2352243 4.43 3.17 
         
Spain 8071.97 1104.73 6.80*10
7
 1.26*10
7
 7.52*10
7
 4270036 7.70 0.78 
 
        
Sweden 2917.33 1807.14 2.95*10
7
 7932337 1.31*10
7
 3024764 9.66 4.98 
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UK 4224.12 3384.27 1.75*10
7
 1.92*10
7
 1.69*10
7
 1.74*10
7
 6.45 6.57 
 
 
CEO Tenure CEO Age CEO Duality State Ownership 
Country Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
         
 
Austria 2.86 1.34 45.86 3.43 1 0 1 0 
 
        
Belgium 7.00 2.74 54.00 2.74 0 0 1 0 
 
        
Denmark 4.67 2.80 53.67 6.34 0 0 0 0 
 
        
Finland 1 0 46.00 13.00 0 0 1 0 
 
        
France 3.00 1.31 58.5 8.63 1 0 1 0 
         
Germany 3.45 1.96 45.73 2.53 1 0 1 0 
 
        
Italy 2.78 1.76 60.07 4.78 0.29 0.47 0 0 
 
        
Holland 4.54 2.66 60.45 4.08 1 0 0 0 
 
        
Poland 4.00 2.16 43.00 2.16 0 0 0.43 0.53 
         
Portugal 3.00 1.58 46.00 1.58 0 0 0 0 
         
Spain 13.00 1.00 67.00 1.00 1 0 0 0 
 
        
Sweden 3.30 1.84 56.84 3.67 0 0 1 0 
         
UK 3.16 1.59 52.84 7.26 0.16 0.37 0.23 0.43 
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